Opinion

Hybrid War at Sea


by Frank Diegel - published on 25 March 2025 2402 -

Electronic warfare in the Baltic Sea is escalating rapidly, with GPS and AIS disruptions posing growing risks to maritime navigation. Russia’s hybrid strategy is targeting both safety and stability in one of Europe’s most critical shipping regions. Pilots and crews now face a new reality: navigating under threat.

In 2025, the Baltic Sea has become a key battleground for electronic warfare, with a sharp rise in GPS and AIS spoofing and jamming incidents—now increasingly impacting coastal regions and major shipping lanes. These disruptions, largely attributed to Russian activity near Kaliningrad, threaten both commercial and military maritime navigation. The timing is no coincidence: Russia is responding to NATO’s expansion, especially after Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. As NATO strengthens its eastern flank, Russia appears determined to destabilize the region through hybrid tactics rather than open confrontation.

For modern shipping, GNSS-based positioning is critical for route planning, port approaches, and safe navigation in restricted waters. However, marine pilots and ship crews now face growing difficulties: incorrect positioning data, unexpected course and speed deviations, and full signal outages are becoming frequent. These interferences not only increase the risk of navigational errors, near misses, or groundings, but also complicate operations in high-traffic or environmentally complex areas where precision is essential.

The psychological and operational impact is mounting. Continuous interference undermines confidence in navigation systems, forcing crews to revert to more manual alternatives such as radar, visual bearings, and inertial navigation. While effective, these methods require greater effort, concentration, and experience—placing added strain on personnel and reducing operational efficiency. Portable Pilot Units (PPUs), commonly used by pilots, must now be equipped to detect spoofing or jamming and issue alerts in real time.

This is not just a safety issue—it’s a strategic one. Russia’s electronic warfare campaign is part of a broader hybrid strategy aimed at undermining NATO cohesion, disrupting commercial operations, and shaping the perception that the Baltic Sea is contested space, not NATO-controlled. The economic impact is already visible: shipping delays, rising insurance premiums, and increasing costs for route planning and monitoring. These disruptions ripple through global supply chains, especially given the Baltic’s role as a vital trade corridor.

Addressing this threat requires a multi-layered response. In addition to technological upgrades such as GNSS interference detection and the use of redundant systems like eLoran or alternative satellite constellations, there must be heightened awareness among pilots and navigators. Rapid identification of position anomalies and suspicious signals is essential. Just as important is international cooperation—to monitor interference patterns, share intelligence, and coordinate countermeasures.

In summary, the surge in electronic interference across the Baltic is not random—it is a deliberate and growing threat. Maritime safety, economic stability, and strategic control of one of Europe’s busiest sea routes are at stake. NATO, maritime authorities, and the shipping industry must respond with urgency, resilience, and unity to safeguard this critical region.

#marinepilots #gnss #navigation #ppu
Editor's note:
Opinion pieces reflect the personal opinion of individual authors. They do not allow any conclusions to be drawn about a prevailing opinion in the respective editorial department. Opinion pieces might be deliberately formulated in a pronounced or even explicit tone and may contain biased arguments. They might be intended to polarise and stimulate discussion. In this, they deliberately differ from the factual articles you typically find on this platform, written to present facts and opinions in as balanced a manner as possible.
Maritime software and hardware development, digitalisation


Frank Diegel is the CEO and founder of Marine-Pilots.com and the CEO of the IT company TRENZ too. His company is located in Bremen (Bremerhaven). He has studied computer science. For more than 15 years he has been developing hard- and software especially for pilots. The topic of digitalisation in shipping is his great passion.
What's your opinion on this?
Login or register to write comments and join the discussion!
Read more...

Video GIDAS - GNSS Interference Detection & Analysis System

published on 29 April 2021

OHB Digital Solutions GmbH develops systems for monitoring the GNSS frequency bands as well as detection, classification and localization of intentional or unintentional interference sources. Many stakeholders and applications as well as critical infrastructure providers are relying on GNSS to provide their services. Since Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are widely used in safety and value critical applications, GIDAS detects, classifies and localizes any GNSS interference...

0

Article New Study on GNSS Interference in the Baltic Sea

by GPSPATRON Sp. z o. o. - published on 12 March 2025

GNSS interference has become a growing challenge in the Baltic Sea, affecting maritime navigation, aviation, and critical infrastructure. While numerous datasets and services, such as gpsjam.org, spoofing.skai-data-services.com, and flightradar24, report high-altitude GNSS interference based on ADS-B data, there is a significant lack of studies focusing on ground-level interference.

3

Article Navigation alternative in the event of GNSS failure due to jamming or spoofing

by TRENZ GmbH - published on 7 April 2025

What happens when GNSS fails? In maritime navigation, this isn’t a hypothetical scenario – it’s a growing risk. Spoofing, jamming, and GNSS outages are increasing, especially in the Baltic Sea region. A failure can cripple navigation systems – with potentially serious consequences.

1

Article Psychophysical stress and strain of maritime pilots in Germany. A cross-sectional study

published on 12 June 2021

Maritime pilots work in an irregular deployment system (rotation system) with unpredictable work assignments under high levels of physical and mental stress. Fatigue or chronic diseases, e.g. coronary heart disease, peptic ulcers or gastritis can occur as a consequence.

4

Article Update: "Strength of Pilot Ladders and Intermediate Securing of Pilot Ladders"

by Capt. Troy Evans - published on 2 November 2020

An investigation into actual strength of ladders and intermediate securing methods used.
Capt. and Marine Pilot Troy Evans (New Zealand) decided to look into pilot ladder strength and intermediate securing arrangements after MNZ put out what he felt was a confusing and unclear document about securing of pilot ladders.

0

Press Release New Pilot Boat for Port of Townsville

by Port of Townsville - published on 15 March 2021

The Port of Townsville has welcomed the newest addition to its fleet of pilot boats with the arrival of the newly built MANTARAY. The $3.3 million, custom-built vessel utilises high-tech equipment and design to maximise safety and efficiency for pilot transfers.

0

Article China: Accident caused by mass pilots quarantines

by www.MaritimeBulletin.net - published on 13 January 2022

According to Captain’s visual observance and overheard radio talks, bulk carrier OLIVE BAY anchor chain entangled with the chain of another ship, on Jan 8 or 9, in Yangtze estuary between Chongming island and Taicang, Shanghai area.

0

Article Rio de Janeiro Pilots have a new president

by Marine-Pilots.com - published on 6 April 2020

Everton Schmidt assumed the position with the commitment to maintain the activities during the new coronavirus pandemic.

0

Article MARS-Report: Paltry PPU position predictor

by The Nautical Insitute - published on 18 August 2023

To monitor the vessel’s progress, the pilot had set up his portable pilotage unit (PPU). He had connected the rate-of-turn generator to the vessel’s pilot plug and had set a variable range marker on the radar with a radius of 0.5 nm.

0